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Book Reviews

Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation.
By Faith Hillis.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. Pp. ix1329. $55.00
In Children of Rus’, Faith Hillis explores the development of Russian nationalism as an
ideological and political phenomenon in Right-Bank Ukraine in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, a timely subject given the current tensions ðspring 2014Þ between
Russia and Ukraine in Crimea. Hillis traces the emergence of a Russian national project
in territories that had historically been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until
their integration into the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century. Well written and chock full of insights into the politics of late Imperial Russia, Children of Rus’
is a model of meticulous scholarship and perceptive analysis and should be essential reading for anyone interested in learning about the complexities of Russian and Ukrainian
identities.
Hillis begins with an examination of the emergence of a “Little Russian” nationalist
ideology that appeared ﬁrst in the area east of the Dnieper River and then spread to the
southwestern borderland ðthe territory from the west bank of the Dnieper River to the
border of the Habsburg Empire populated by a mix of inhabitants who spoke Polish,
Russian, Yiddish, and UkrainianÞ after the region had become part of the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great. Orthodox clerics and Cossack leaders challenged the
dominance of the Polish-Catholic gentry by positing that Orthodox believers in the area,
as descendants of Rus’ and its Orthodox faith, were the native inhabitants of the region
and therefore the rightful owners of its land and resources. As Hillis notes, “By identifying the territory that they interchangeably called Little Russia and Ukraine as the birthplace of the Rus’ faith, they also situated themselves at the center of a larger Orthodox
world” and asserted that local culture and traditions were “authentic and essential manifestations of Rus’ culture” ð12Þ.
At ﬁrst Imperial ofﬁcials paid little attention to the proponents of a Little Russian identity. But the Polish revolt of 1830–31 prompted St. Petersburg to recognize the political
value of the Little Russian idea as a bulwark against Polish nationalism. As Little Russian
activists settled in Kiev, found work in the state bureaucracy, and joined government
commissions devoted to the study of the history and archaeology of the region, they claimed
that the southwestern territories had been home to a ﬂourishing East Slavic culture before Polish rule enabled Poles and Jews to exploit the descendants of Rus’. The Little
Russian lobby did not challenge the integrity of the Russian Empire because it believed
in the cultural unity of East Slavic Orthodox believers. Consequently, Imperial policy makers embraced the Little Russian idea as a way to undermine the position of non–East Slavs.
Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the second Polish revolt in 1863, St. Petersburg
redoubled its efforts to repress Polish nationalism and welcomed efforts by advocates of
the Little Russian idea to challenge the perceived economic and political power of Poles
and Jews in the southwest. Hillis writes, “Indeed, the Little Russian idea remained a centerpiece of ofﬁcial efforts to claim the southwestern borderlands for the empire. . . . Well
into the twentieth century, inﬂuential ﬁgures in the St. Petersburg ministries and the Kiev
governor-general’s ofﬁce would hail its potential to reinforce the unity of the empire and
the East Slavic descendants of Rus’ ” ð88Þ. By the end of the nineteenth century the
educated and cultural elite in the southwest had adopted the Little Russian idea, which
by then had morphed into an ideology and political movement that advocated on behalf of a Russian nation that constituted the nucleus of the empire. Speciﬁcally, the Russian nationalist movement in Right-Bank Ukraine mobilized on behalf of Orthodox be-
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lievers and sought to weaken if not eliminate the inﬂuence of non-Orthodox Poles and
Jews. Eventually they helped form the Nationalist Party, the second largest party in the
empire on the eve of World War I and the best-organized and most politically effective
organization of late Imperial Russia. The persistence of activists, the dynamics of local
politics and society, and the support of bureaucrats in St. Petersburg help to explain why
a region where few of its inhabitants spoke Russian as their native language managed to
become a bastion of Russian nationalism by 1914.
Hillis stresses that Little Russian identity and ideology were not identical to Ukrainian nationalism, though at times they coincided. Nor was it the same as Imperial Russian identity, though, again, at times they worked together to undermine those nationalist
movements perceived to threaten the integrity of the empire. She argues that the Little
Russian movement was far from monolithic: radical, liberal, and conservative factions
existed, each advocating different resolutions to the problems they believed beset the
Orthodox believers in the southwest border territories. By the outbreak of war in the
summer of 1914 the movement had lost its coherence, largely because some advocates of
the Little Russia idea had come to embrace Ukrainian separatism as a platform, while
many other nationalist patriots had reached the conclusion that the idea threatened the
unity of the empire. Moreover, tsarist ofﬁcials now feared the challenges posed by any
form of ethnoreligious Russian nationalism. Rather than contribute to the stability of the
empire, Russian nationalist organizations threatened to unravel the tattered fabric of social and political stability.
Hillis traces how Little Russian activists were able to assume a leading role in southwestern politics after the turn of the twentieth century. Like elsewhere in the empire, mass
politics, particularly on the local level, came of age in the years after the Revolution of 1905.
But she notes that the civil society in late Imperial Russia included groups who were
anything but civil. Virulent antisemitism was rife among the Russian nationalists examined by Hillis, and some nationalist activists did not shy away from attacking Jews. As
Hillis notes, “Denouncing the very notion of civic equality as an existential threat to
Rus’ traditions, right-bank nationalists demanded a strong, interventionist, and illiberal
state that would promote the welfare of some of its subjects and marginalize others” ð16Þ.
Robert Weinberg
Swarthmore College
Open Letters: Russian Popular Culture and the Picture Postcard, 1880–1922.
By Alison Rowley.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013. Pp. xii1323. $65.00.
This book is a welcome addition to the study of Russian visual culture. Russian publishers began to issue postcards in quantity in the 1890s several decades after their European
colleagues. Postcards quickly gained prominence. The topics of these mini-views of the
world concerned everything from political and religious leaders to celebrities, tourism,
advertising, propaganda, movies, humor, art, and erotica. Producers used them to raise
money for charity, to inﬂuence opinion, to commemorate something, or to make a proﬁt.
People bought them, used them, or saved them for many different reasons. Like phonograph records and sheet music they were national and transnational, imported and exported
by citizens and foreigners alike. The complexity of the medium and its seemingly peripheral
character may explain its partial neglect by European historians and even more so by those
of Russia. This book is a welcome remedy for that neglect.
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